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Sovereignty of Aves Island: 
An Argument Against Standardized, Compulsory Arbitration
Introduction
Territorial boundaries, if well-established and recognized, 
add stability to relations between neighbor states.1 Boundary 
uncertainties, however, often lead to disputes which 
significantly hamper state relations.2 While territorial boundary 
disputes directly affect a state’s citizens,3 maritime boundary 
disputes often affect economic relations between states.4 If 
states’ claims of sovereignty of territory and resources located 
therein conflict, disputes may quickly escalate unless states 
employ means of dispute resolution.5
For example, Venezuela currently maintains a dispute over 
the sovereignty of the Isla Aves (Bird Island) with various
Caribbean countries.6 Venezuela and Dominica, in particular, 
claim sovereignty of the Island and the natural resources 
located in its surrounding maritime territory.7 Since neither 
Venezuela nor Dominica appears willing to compromise,8 the 
increasing tension between the states may result in armed 
conflict unless they engage in preemptive dispute resolution.9
States engaging in preemptive dispute resolution frequently 
call upon adjudicative or diplomatic means to resolve 
2territorial boundary disputes and comply with international 
law.10 In light of reduced efficacy of such dispute resolution
mechanisms,11 however, some propose that all states should engage 
in compulsory, standardized arbitration subject to International 
Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”) review to resolve their boundary 
disputes.12 Although arbitration is an effective method of 
international dispute resolution in certain cases,13 standardized 
arbitration will not effectively resolve all boundary disputes 
between neighbor states.14
This Comment argues against the proposition that the United 
Nations (“U.N.”) implement a standardized arbitration mechanism 
and discusses implications of such a requirement on the current 
dispute over the sovereignty of Aves Island.15 Part I first 
presents Venezuela’s and Dominica’s claims of sovereignty of the
Island.16 Part I next highlights arbitration and mediation as 
internationally accepted means of dispute resolution and 
discusses the use of arbitration in Case Concerning East Timor
(“Portugal v. Australia”),17 and Case Concerning Land and 
Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (“Cameroon v. 
Nigeria”).18
Part II argues against a U.N. compulsory arbitration 
requirement by first discussing its inconsistency with 
Venezuela’s and Dominica’s sovereignty in light of Portugal v. 
Australia.19 Part II next discusses Cameroon v. Nigeria to 
3demonstrate that compulsory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review 
will not effectively resolve the Aves Island dispute because the 
I.C.J. is unable to enforce decisions.20 Part II also illustrates 
how compulsory arbitration decreases the efficiency of 
international dispute resolution in light of Cameroon v. 
Nigeria.21
Part III recommends that the U.N. should not implement 
compulsory, standardized arbitration but rather provide a forum 
in which states engage in a combination of mediation and 
arbitration (“Med-Arb”) to resolve their disputes.22 Part III 
also recommends that Venezuela and Dominica, similar to the 
parties in International Business Machines, Corp. v. Fujitsu, 
Ltd. (“I.B.M. v. Fujitsu”), engage in Med-Arb to capitalize on 
its advantages to resolve their dispute.23 Part IV then 
concludes that all states should engage in Med-Arb in their 
international boundary disputes to achieve effective redress in 
the future.24
I. Background
Because the sovereignty of Aves Island has significant 
economic implications for both Venezuela and Dominica, both 
states claim sovereignty of the Island and the resources located 
in its surrounding maritime territory.25 To prevent disputing 
states such as Venezuela and Dominica from resorting to force to 
settle their dispute, the U.N. provides diplomatic and 
4adjudicative means of dispute resolution which states may employ 
to peacefully resolve their disputes.26 Portugal v. Australia
demonstrates that dispute settlement requires state consent.27
Cameroon v. Nigeria highlights the inefficacy of dispute 
settlement where non-consenting states fail to recognize and 
comply with settlement awards.28 Finally, I.B.M. v. Fujitsu
indicates that consensual dispute settlement may increase the 
efficacy and efficiency of dispute resolution.29
A. Venezuela and Dominica Have Conflicting Claims of 
Sovereignty of Aves Island and the Resources 
Located in its Surrounding Maritime Territory
Venezuela recently reaffirmed its claim of sovereignty of
Aves Island.30 Dominica and various Caribbean countries, however, 
object to Venezuela’s increased show of authority over the 
Island and may seek resolution of the long-standing dispute 
through maritime dispute resolution mechanisms.31 Aves Island, 
located approximately 350 nautical miles (“nm”) northeast of 
Venezuela and 140 nm southwest of Dominica,32 is famous for its 
spectacular birds and endangered sea turtles.33 More importantly, 
the Island is surrounded by maritime territory with significant 
natural resources.34 Because the natural resources comprise 
approximately twenty percent of the world’s natural gas 
reserves, the dispute has significant economic implications for 
the international community.35
51. Venezuela Claims Sovereignty of Aves 
Island Based on Historic Title
Venezuela claims that its historic title and sovereignty of
the Island dates to the nineteenth century.36 Although other 
countries claimed sovereignty of the Island during the past two 
centuries,37 Venezuela consistently exercised authority over the 
Island during the end of the twentieth and beginning of the 
twenty-first centuries.38 Venezuela also claims sovereignty of 
the maritime territory surrounding the Island that extends 
approximately 335 nm north of its coastal baselines.39 Lastly, 
though Venezuela has not yet ratified the U.N. Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”),40 Venezuela claims that its 
sovereignty of Aves Island grants it rightful access to any 
territorial waters, exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”), and 
continental shelf under UNCLOS’ provisions.41
2. Dominica Claims Sovereignty of Aves Island Because 
it Lies Within Dominica’s Exclusive Economic Zone
In contrast, Dominica and other Caribbean countries claim
that Dominica has sovereignty of Aves Island under the 
provisions of UNCLOS and object to Venezuela’s increasing show 
of authority over the Island.42 Dominica asserts that its claim 
to Aves Island is stronger than that of Venezuela’s because the 
Island, located within 140 nm of Dominica’s coastal baselines,
6falls within its EEZ under UNCLOS.43 Dominica also objects to 
Venezuela’s claim of sovereignty of the maritime territory that 
surrounds Aves Island because it apportions significant maritime 
territory away from Dominica and other Caribbean Islands.44
B. Venezuela and Dominica May Resolve Their Dispute over 
the Sovereignty of Aves Island Through Internationally 
Accepted Means of Dispute Resolution 
Dispute resolution mechanisms allow states to settle 
disputes without employing force.45 The U.N., in fact, even 
obligates member states to attempt peaceful resolution of 
disputes.46 The U.N. Charter identifies eight acceptable methods 
of dispute resolution which are either adjudicative or 
diplomatic in nature.47 Whether states engage in adjudicative or 
diplomatic means to resolve their disputes,48 all such mechanisms 
rely on states’ consent for dispute settlement.49
1. Arbitration as an Adjudicative
Dispute Resolution Mechanism
Adjudicative means of dispute resolution require governing 
bodies to apply precedent and customary international law when 
resolving disputes between states.50 States employing
adjudicative means of dispute resolution may elect formal, in-
court adjudication or arbitration by temporary arbitral 
tribunals.51 States often prefer international arbitration over 
adjudication to resolve their disputes because arbitration 
ideally offers more efficiency and expediency than that offered 
7by adjudication.52 After states consent to arbitration,53 they 
compose a set of rules and procedures for the arbitral tribunal 
to follow during arbitration.54 The tribunal then issues an award 
that is binding on the parties.55
2. Mediation as a Diplomatic Dispute Resolution
Mechanism and Alternative to Arbitration 
Mediation, a diplomatic method of dispute resolution, 
offers states an opportunity to resolve their dispute through 
negotiations mediated by a neutral third-party.56 States engage 
in diplomatic means of dispute resolution, mediation in 
particular, to reconcile their interests and reach a consensual 
agreement.57 Mediation is an advantageous method of dispute 
resolution because it grants states significant autonomy and 
flexibility during the resolution process,58 results in an 
impartial award by third-party mediators,59 and is even more 
efficient than arbitration.60
C. Portugal’s and Australia’s Dispute over
East Timor Demonstrates that Dispute 
Settlement Requires State Consent
1. Framing Portugal’s and Australia’s Historical
Claims of Sovereignty of East Timor
Although the Democratic Republic of East Timor is now 
independent, its sovereignty has been disputed since the 
sixteenth century.61 While both Portugal and Holland exercised 
sovereignty over East Timor between the sixteenth and twentieth 
centuries, East Timor unilaterally declared its independence 
8from Portugal in 1975.62 A dispute between Portugal and Australia
arose in 1991 when Portugal alleged that Australia engaged in 
actions which failed to respect Portugal as East Timor’s 
administering power.63 Australia, in contrast, contended that the 
East Timorese granted it international responsibility for 
Timor.64
2. Portugal v. Australia Implicates a
Third State Which Did Not Consent 
to I.C.J. Adjudication
Portugal initiated proceedings against Australia because 
Australia failed to recognize Portugal’s sovereignty of East 
Timor prior to 1991.65 Both states consented to arbitration by 
the I.C.J.,66 but Australia objected to arbitration without 
Indonesia’s consent as an interested third-party.67 The I.C.J. 
decided that Indonesia’s actions with regard to East Timor
directly influenced the Court’s determination of whether 
Australia acted lawfully with respect to East Timor.68 Because 
Indonesia did not consent to arbitration, the I.C.J. lacked 
jurisdiction over the dispute and could not rule without 
undermining Indonesia’s sovereign right to consent to 
arbitration.69
9D. Nigeria Fails to Comply with the Decision
of the I.C.J. in Cameroon v. Nigeria
1. Framing Cameroon’s Dispute over the 
Bakassi Peninsula with Nigeria
Cameroon’s border dispute with Nigeria, centering on the 
sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula and maritime territory 
surrounding Lake Chad,70 stemmed from ambiguous demarcation of 
German territory in Western Africa after World War One.71 Before 
tension over the border dispute escalated to armed conflict,72
however, Cameroon submitted the dispute to the I.C.J for binding 
demarcation of the peninsula and the maritime area surrounding 
Lake Chad.73
2. The I.C.J. Is Unable to Enforce 
Its Award in Cameroon v. Nigeria 
Cameroon submitted its boundary dispute with Nigeria to the 
I.C.J. for binding adjudication in 1994.74 Both Cameroon and 
Nigeria claimed that they inherited title to the Bakassi 
Peninsula through the concept of uti possidetis juris when they 
became independent states.75 Under this concept, disputing states 
such as Cameroon and Nigeria inherit their colonial borders when 
they become independent.76 In its 2002 decision the I.C.J.
granted Cameroon sovereignty of Bakassi Peninsula and a large 
portion of the maritime territory surrounding Lake Chad.77
Although the award supposedly had binding force, however, 
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Nigeria did not initially recognize the decision and has yet to 
legitimize or comply with the I.C.J.’s order to withdraw from 
Bakassi.78
E. I.B.M. and Fujitsu Use a Combination of 
Mediation and Arbitration to Resolve 
Their Landmark Dispute
In I.B.M. v. Fujitsu, a landmark copyright infringement 
case, I.B.M. and Fujitsu engaged in a combination of mediation 
and arbitration to resolve their dispute.79 Employing Med-Arb
allowed the arbitrators to capitalize on the advantages of both 
mediation and arbitration to facilitate an efficient settlement 
process.80 Med-Arb consists of two distinct stages.81 In the first 
stage of Med-Arb, mediators attempt to facilitate agreement 
between the parties by directing negotiations.82 If disputing 
parties fail to reach an agreement through mediation, however, 
the same third-party mediator then arbitrates the dispute.83 In 
Med-Arb, the arbiter has traditional arbitral duties and 
eventually issues a decision that has binding force on the 
parties.84
II. Analysis
The U.N. should not require arbitration of all boundary 
disputes because it violates state sovereignty embodied in 
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.85 First, compulsory arbitration 
violates the sovereignty of disputing states such as Venezuela 
and Dominica because it eliminates their right to consent to 
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dispute resolution and to self-determination.86 Second, 
compulsory arbitration will not resolve boundary disputes 
effectively because it results in settlement noncompliance and 
creates international enforcement issues.87 Lastly, compulsory 
arbitration creates inefficiencies in dispute settlement because 
it eliminates the opportunity for states such as Venezuela and 
Dominica to resolve their dispute through bilateral negotiations 
or other regional settlement mechanisms.88
A. Requiring Venezuela and Dominica to Arbitrate 
Their Dispute with Regard to Aves Island 
Violates Their Sovereignty Under 
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter
The U.N.’s implementation of compulsory, standardized 
arbitration violates Venezuela’s and Dominica’s state 
sovereignty for two reasons.89 First, compulsory arbitration 
violates Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which grants disputing 
states such as Venezuela and Dominica sovereign equality.90
Second, Portugal v. Australia demonstrates that Venezuela’s and 
Dominica’s sovereignty encompasses the right to consent to the 
resolution of their dispute over Aves Island.91 Finally, 
compulsory arbitration is inconsistent with the U.N.’s grant to 
member states of self-determination in Article 55, which grants 
them the sovereign right to choose a method of dispute 
resolution from the range of internationally accepted means.92
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1. Compulsory Arbitration Violates Venezuela’s and 
Dominica’s Sovereignty Under Article 2 of the 
U.N. Charter
Implementing a requirement that states engage in 
arbitration directly conflicts with the right of sovereignty
granted to states by Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.93 This
article, granting sovereign equality to all member states of the 
U.N.,94 vests states with the sovereign right to use, dispose of, 
and prevent unauthorized access to their territory by other 
states.95 More broadly, this sovereign right empowers states to 
act in manners reasonably necessary to further state interests 
and those of their citizens.96
Not surprisingly, the Aves Island dispute affects both 
Venezuela’s and Dominica’s state sovereignty.97 When they 
ratified the U.N. Charter and became member states, Venezuela 
and Dominica received sovereign equality as member states under 
Article 2.98 Thus the U.N. Charter grants Venezuela and Dominica, 
as sovereign states, the right to take action and protect their 
state interests and the best interests of their citizens.99
Compulsory arbitration violates Venezuela’s and Dominica’s state 
sovereignty under Article 2 of the U.N. Charter because it 
denies their right to political and economic independence.100
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2. Portugal v. Australia Demonstrates that Compulsory 
Arbitration is Inconsistent with Venezuela’s and 
Dominica’s Sovereignty Because it Dispenses with 
Their Right to Consent to Resolution
of Their Dispute 
Venezuela and Dominica have a sovereign right to consent to 
settlement of their dispute over Aves Island.101 In Portugal v. 
Australia, for example, the I.C.J. found that it could not 
decide a dispute that involved a non-consenting state party.102
With regard to Aves Island, both Venezuela and Dominica may 
refer to the I.C.J.’s rationale in Portugal v. Australia and 
argue that a requirement of compulsory arbitration will 
undermine their sovereign right to consent to the resolution of 
their dispute.103 This argument is especially persuasive in the 
case of Venezuela because it has not yet ratified UNCLOS.104 This 
demonstrates that Venezuela does not desire to be bound by 
mandatory arbitration in its international disputes.105 As such, 
compulsory arbitration will violate Venezuela’s and Dominica’s 
sovereign right to consent to the resolution of their dispute 
over Aves Island.106
3. Compulsory Arbitration Violates Article 55
of the U.N. Charter Which Grants Member 
States the Right to Self-Determination
As U.N. member states, both Venezuela and Dominica have the 
right to self-determination under Article 55 of the U.N. 
Charter.107 Because self-determination encompasses the sovereign 
right to consent to dispute settlement, compulsory arbitration 
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violates Venezuela’s and Dominica’s right under Article 55 to 
consent to the resolution of their dispute over Aves Island.108
Additionally, Article 55 specifically indicates that member 
states enjoy self-determination with regard to economic and 
social conditions and development.109 Thus Venezuela and 
Dominica, under this article, have the right to take action and 
protect both the stability of their economic, inter-state 
relations and their individual state interests.110
Applying Article 55 of the U.N. Charter to the Aves Island 
dispute, Venezuela and Dominica justifiably may seek to exercise 
their sovereign right to self-determination with regard to their 
dispute.111 Aves Island itself, for example, will provide both 
states with a significant source of additional income from its 
increasing tourism activities.112 More importantly, however, 
sovereignty of the Island may grant either state control over 
its coastal baselines under UNCLOS Articles 3, 57, and 76.113
Under these provisions, for example, Dominica or Venezuela 
may obtain exclusive rights to exploit the vast natural gas 
reserves located within the maritime territory surrounding the 
Island.114 Dominica, in particular, has a strong claim to 
sovereignty of Aves Island and the available natural resources 
because the Island is located within Dominica’s EEZ under UNCLOS 
Article 57.115 Because both states have significant interests in 
Aves Island and the resources in its surrounding maritime 
15
territory, compulsory arbitration violates their sovereign right 
to consent to resolution in a manner that best protects their 
state interests and those of their citizens.116
4. Portugal v. Australia Supports the Right of 
Venezuela and Dominica to Self-Determination 
of Their Dispute
Entitled to self-determination under Article 55 of the U.N. 
Charter, Venezuela and Dominica have a sovereign right to select 
an acceptable method of dispute resolution from those enumerated 
in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.117 The I.C.J. supported the 
sovereign right of states to self-determination in Portugal v. 
Australia.118 In that case, the I.C.J. noted that self-
determination vested all states interested in East Timor with 
the right to protect their sovereignty of disputed resources.119
Applying Article 55 and the I.C.J.’s rationale in Portugal 
v. Australia to the instant dispute, Venezuela and Dominica are 
similarly entitled to choose an acceptable method of dispute 
resolution.120 Consistent with the I.C.J.’s ruling in Portugal v. 
Australia, Venezuela and Dominica may select a means of dispute 
settlement that best protects their state interests and those of 
their citizens with regard to Aves Island and the resources in 
its surrounding maritime territory.121 Because compulsory 
arbitration denies Venezuela and Dominica their right to select 
optimal dispute resolution methods, both states will lose 
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autonomy to select means of settlement and procedures that best 
protect their state interests and those of their citizens.122
When exercising its right under Article 55 of the U.N. 
Charter to self-determination, Venezuela may want to engage in 
mediation with Dominica as the most effective method of dispute 
settlement.123 As a larger, more economically powerful state,124
Venezuela could apply political and economic pressures to 
Dominica during bilateral negotiations where it could not in the 
more formalized procedures of arbitration or adjudication.125
This, in turn, may coerce Dominica into premature or unnecessary 
compromise; thereby saving Venezuela the burden and additional 
costs of formal arbitration or adjudication.126
Dominica, in contrast, may rely on the I.C.J.’s rationale 
in Portugal v. Australia and consider formal arbitration or 
adjudication to be the best dispute resolution method to protect
its interests in Aves Island and the resources in the Island’s 
surrounding maritime territory.127 Such formal procedures may 
provide a higher guarantee of impartiality and equality in any 
award.128 Additionally, because Dominica is not as economically 
powerful, it may want to stipulate specific conditions and 
procedures of settlement.129 By denying Venezuela and Dominica an 
opportunity to select the procedures of their settlement, 
compulsory arbitration not only undermines dispute resolution’s 
intended flexibility but violates their right to self-
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determination under Article 55 of the U.N. Charter and the 
rationale of the I.C.J. in Portugal v. Australia.130
B. Compulsory Arbitration Subject to I.C.J. Review Will
Not Resolve the Aves Island Dispute Because the I.C.J. is 
Unable to Enforce Decisions Against Non-Consenting States
The U.N. requirement that all states engage in compulsory, 
standardized arbitration subject to I.C.J. review is 
unpersuasive for two reasons.131 First, Cameroon v. Nigeria
demonstrates that disputing states such as Venezuela and 
Dominica may not cooperate during settlement or comply with an 
arbitral award where they do not originally consent to the 
resolution of their dispute.132 Second, although Article 94 of 
the U.N. Charter provides the U.N. Security Council with the 
capability to enforce I.C.J. decisions, I.C.J. decisions are 
effectively unenforceable unless disputes rise to a level that 
endangers international peace and security.133
1. Compulsory Arbitration Reduces the Likelihood for 
Compliance with an Arbitral Award Where Either 
Venezuela or Dominica Withholds Consent to
Settlement of Their Dispute
Effective resolution of international boundary disputes 
requires states such as Venezuela and Dominica to cooperate 
during settlement through recognition and compliance with any 
resulting award.134 Articles 2 and 33 of the U.N. Charter, in 
fact, obligate U.N. member states to attempt peaceful resolution 
of their disputes in good faith.135 Venezuela’s and Dominica’s 
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cooperation in resolving their dispute over Aves Island is 
especially important because the dispute affects the allocation 
of vast amounts of economic resources located in the maritime 
territory surrounding the Island.136 Subjecting the dispute to 
compulsory arbitration, however, falsely assumes that both 
Venezuela and Dominica will cooperate during dispute settlement 
and then recognize and comply with any resulting arbitral 
award.137
In Cameroon v. Nigeria, for example, Nigeria did not comply 
initially with the I.C.J.’s award of Bakassi Peninsula to 
Cameroon because it considered the decision of the I.C.J. 
invalid where Nigeria withheld its consent to dispute 
settlement.138 Similarly, if either Venezuela or Dominica is
predisposed to withhold consent to the settlement of their 
dispute, then it is unlikely that they will cooperate during 
settlement or comply with an award because they may not consider 
the settlement or its award legitimate.139
Venezuela, for example, demonstrated its lack of consent to 
be bound by compulsory dispute settlement when it failed to 
ratify the provisions of UNCLOS.140 If the I.C.J. determines that 
Venezuela is the losing state then it may oblige Venezuela to 
implement an unfavorable judgment as it obliged Nigeria in 
Cameroon v. Nigeria.141 Venezuela, however, is unlikely to comply 
with an unfavorable decision where it specifically has not 
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consented to dispute settlement.142 Therefore, compulsory 
arbitration will not resolve Venezuela’s dispute with Dominica 
over Aves Island where either party withholds consent and then 
fails to comply with an arbitral award.143
2. The I.C.J. Lacks Capability to Enforce an Award
if Either Venezuela or Dominica Fail to 
Comply with Compulsory Arbitration  
Compulsory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review will not 
resolve the Aves Island dispute because the I.C.J. lacks 
enforcement capability over Venezuela and Dominica.144 Cameroon 
v. Nigeria demonstrates that international bodies are unable to 
enforce decisions.145 After the I.C.J. issued an unfavorable 
ruling against Nigeria, Cameroon had the ability under Article 
94 of the U.N. Charter to seek enforcement of the award through 
the U.N. Security Council.146 Unlike Cameroon v. Nigeria, where 
both states previously accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the I.C.J., neither Venezuela nor Dominica have consented to the 
I.C.J.’s compulsory jurisdiction.147 Because the I.C.J. may only 
entertain disputes in which states consent to its jurisdiction, 
compulsory arbitration will result in an innocuous and 
unenforceable award.148
Even if Venezuela and Dominica accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the I.C.J., however, international law lacks 
effective remedies for noncompliance with arbitral awards.149 In 
that instance, for example, either state may seek judicial 
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enforcement of an arbitral decision under Article 94 of the U.N. 
Charter.150 As demonstrated in Cameroon v. Nigeria, however, 
Article 94 offers disputing states ineffective remedies.151
Though its language is vague, Article 94 expressly empowers the 
Security Council to recommend action to resolve the dispute.152
Additionally, although Article 94 of the U.N. Charter 
empowers the U.N. Security Council to intervene and enforce 
I.C.J. decisions through imposing economic and political 
sanctions and using force, the Security Council is unlikely to 
intervene in the instant dispute unless the conflict rises to a 
level that endangers international peace and security.153 Even if 
the Security Council intervenes, Venezuela could withstand 
economic and political pressure because of its status as an 
economically powerful state.154 Intervention might affect 
Dominica if deemed the losing state; however, Dominica also may 
withstand economic pressure by relying on resources from other 
members in the Caribbean Community.155 Because the U.N. Security 
Council’s enforcement capability will likely have limited effect 
on the Aves Island dispute, compulsory arbitration thus fails to 
effectively resolve the dispute between Venezuela and 
Dominica.156
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C. Compulsory Arbitration Subject to I.C.J. Review
Creates Inefficiency for the I.C.J. and for 
Disputing States Such as Venezuela and Dominica
Requiring states to engage in standardized arbitration 
under I.C.J. review is an inefficient process of dispute 
resolution.157 First, mandatory arbitration subject to I.C.J. 
review creates inefficiencies in the hierarchy of dispute 
resolution bodies set forth in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.158
Second, Cameroon v. Nigeria demonstrates that compulsory 
arbitration also deprives disputing states such as Venezuela and 
Dominica the efficiencies of engaging in bilateral negotiations 
or regional dispute settlement mechanisms.159
1. Compulsory Arbitration Bypasses Preliminary 
Diplomatic Dispute Settlement Procedures 
Embodied in the U.N. Charter
Though proposed to make international dispute resolution 
more efficient, mandatory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review 
in fact decreases its efficiency.160 Under Article 33 of the U.N. 
Charter, the U.N. set forth a hierarchy of settlement methods 
from which states should choose to resolve their disputes.161 By 
first referencing negotiation, mediation, and conciliation in 
its list of acceptable means of dispute settlement, Article 33 
indicates that states engaging in such preliminary bilateral 
procedures add to the administrative efficiency of the hierarchy 
of international dispute resolution.162
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Compulsory arbitration subject to I.C.J. review, for 
instance, eliminates the opportunity for Venezuela and Dominica 
to negotiate bilaterally by mandating initial arbitration of the 
Aves Island dispute before the I.C.J.163 Even if bilateral 
negotiations between Venezuela and Dominica fail, compulsory 
arbitration will deprive them an opportunity to settle 
regionally before mechanisms such as the Permanent Council of 
the Organization of the American States as well.164 By 
eliminating these opportunities, compulsory arbitration 
decreases the efficiency of the dispute resolution hierarchy 
embodied in Article 33 by requiring all disputes be reviewed at 
the I.C.J. level.165
2. Compulsory Arbitration Deprives Disputing States 
Such as Venezuela and Dominica the Efficiencies 
of Engaging in Bilateral Settlement Procedures 
Implementing compulsory arbitration not only decreases 
administrative efficiency of international dispute resolution,
but deprives disputing states such as Venezuela and Dominica the 
efficiencies of bilateral settlement procedures as well.166 In 
Cameroon v. Nigeria, the I.C.J. noted that “regional agencies,”
geared towards the resolution of geographically specific 
disputes, are often the appropriate settlement mechanism for 
territorial boundary disputes.167 In addition, Article 52 of the 
U.N. Charter emphasizes the efficiency of regional settlement 
mechanisms.168 This emphasis indicates that regional settlement 
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mechanisms may offer Venezuela and Dominica efficiencies that 
standard adjudication or arbitration lack.169
For example, regional settlement might offer Venezuela and 
Dominica the benefits of local expertise with regard to regional 
law, customs, and agreements.170 Regional experts, in consensus 
with regard to local law, add predictability and transparency to 
awards from regional settlement mechanisms while shortening the 
time necessary for dispute resolution.171 Thus, mandatory 
arbitration will deprive Venezuela and Dominica the efficiencies 
of lower costs, faster results, and access to justice that 
regional mechanisms offer.172
III. Recommendations
By providing a forum for states to engage in Med-Arb when 
resolving their disputes, the U.N. may foster a more effective 
and efficient means of dispute resolution than that offered 
through compulsory, standardized arbitration.173 First, Med-Arb
is an effective means of dispute resolution for disputing states 
such as Venezuela and Dominica because it encourages state 
cooperation in dispute settlement and compliance with settlement 
awards.174 Second, Med-Arb adds efficiency to the dispute 
resolution process by providing states such as Venezuela and 
Dominica with the advantages of both mediation and arbitration 
in their dispute settlement.175
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A. Venezuela and Dominica Should Engage in Med-Arb Because
it Will Make Their Settlement Processes More Effective 
By engaging in Med-Arb, Venezuela and Dominica could add 
efficacy to settlement procedures and results with regard to
their dispute over Aves Island.176 In recognizing Venezuela’s and 
Dominica’s sovereign right to consent to resolution of their 
dispute, Med-Arb will make their dispute resolution process more 
effective by encouraging both states to cooperate and attempt 
resolution of the Aves Island dispute in good faith.177 Second,
because Med-Arb increases the likelihood that states reach 
settlement, it will add efficacy to Venezuela’s and Dominica’s 
dispute resolution by encouraging settlement compliance and 
curing any potential enforcement issues with regard to their 
dispute.178
1. Med-Arb Will Increase the Effectiveness of Dispute 
Settlement by Encouraging Both Venezuela and 
Dominica to Cooperate During Settlement and 
Make Good-Faith Attempts at Dispute Resolution
Venezuela and Dominica can increase the effectiveness of 
their dispute resolution process through using Med-Arb in their 
settlement.179 Med-Arb, unlike compulsory arbitration, is based 
upon the consent of disputing parties to resolve their 
dispute.180 The parties in I.B.M. v. Fujitsu, for example, 
established consent to the processes of Med-Arb in their initial 
meetings.181 This consensus allowed the parties to establish a 
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framework agreement that encompassed the development of the 
processes of Med-Arb and each party’s obligations.182
Similarly, Venezuela and Dominica should undergo Med-Arb 
in their dispute over Aves Island to increase the effectiveness 
of their dispute settlement.183 For example, establishing a 
framework agreement that defines the development of their 
settlement and its processes will clarify and offer direction to 
both Venezuela and Dominica with regard to their obligations 
during settlement.184 In addition, Venezuela and Dominica are 
more likely to cooperate with procedures and honor obligations 
that they agree to in a framework agreement.185
2. Med-Arb Encourages Compliance with Settlement 
and Cures Enforcement Issues 
Med-Arb may also increase the effectiveness of settlement 
of the Aves Island dispute because Med-Arb encourages compliance 
with awards.186 As I.B.M. v. Fujitsu demonstrates, parties are 
more likely to recognize and comply with Med-Arb awards because 
they stem from consensual negotiations during the mediation 
phase of Med-Arb mediation phase.187 If Venezuela and Dominica
agree to engage in Med-Arb to settle their dispute, they, 
similarly, are likely to recognize any resulting award because 
they initially consented to Med-Arb and its procedures.188
I.B.M. v. Fujitsu also demonstrates that Med-Arb encourages 
mutually favorable agreements by allowing disputing parties such 
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as Venezuela and Dominica to choose resolution procedures
autonomously.189 Where Venezuela and Dominica autonomously set 
Med-Arb procedures and guidelines, they are more likely to 
comply because they previously consented to Med-Arb’s 
processes.190 Even if Venezuela and Dominica fail to reach 
complete agreement during the initial mediation phase, they may 
agree to a binding award issued during Med-Arb’s arbitration 
phase.191 Further, Venezuela and Dominica may draft enforcement 
clauses that offer either party various forums in which to 
enforce the award.192 Thus since Venezuela and Dominica will have 
more autonomy during Med-Arb, they are more likely to comply 
with its result.193
B. Venezuela and Dominica Should Engage in Med-Arb Because 
it Adds Efficiency to Their Dispute Resolution Process
Med-Arb increases the efficiency of Venezuela’s and 
Dominica’s dispute resolution because it allows them to 
capitalize on the advantages of both mediation and arbitration 
to resolve their dispute.194 Med-Arb affords disputing states 
such as Dominica and Venezuela various procedural 
efficiencies.195 After the arbiters in IBM v. Fujitsu attempted 
dispute resolution through various unstructured processes, they 
then streamlined their dispute resolution process by employing a 
two step Med-Arb process that conserved resources.196
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Venezuela and Dominica, similarly, may profit procedurally 
by conserving resources if they engage in Med-Arb.197 For 
example, if Venezuela and Dominica reach an agreement with 
regard to the parties’ relationship during the initial mediation 
phase, the arbiters will save resources typically required to 
determine allocations of fault in the dispute.198 Med-Arb also 
allows disputing states such as Venezuela and Dominica to 
resolve preliminary issues in its mediation phase and thus 
reduce the number of outstanding issues subject to arbitration 
in the subsequent arbitration phase.199 If Venezuela and Dominica 
fail to reach a complete agreement in the initial mediation 
phase of Med-Arb, however, their third-party mediator will
transition into the role of a third-party arbiter equipped with 
standard arbiter duties and enforcement abilities.200
As I.B.M. v. Fujitsu demonstrates, this role change will 
likely increase the efficiency of Venezuela’s and Dominica’s 
dispute settlement because the arbiters may focus on the states’ 
core interests and settlement goals instead of their rights.201
In addition, third-party arbiters may eliminate discovery in 
fact-intensive disputes such as that over Aves Island because 
they are already familiar with the dispute and its facts.202
Because it allows the arbiters to save time and discovery 
expenses, Med-Arb thus affords disputing states such as 
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Venezuela and Dominica procedural efficiencies that compulsory 
arbitration may lack.203
Conclusion
States contribute to international peace and security by 
resolving their disputes through accepted means of dispute 
resolution.204 States are entitled to select from a myriad of 
accepted dispute settlement mechanisms to resolve their 
disputes.205 A requirement that disputing states such as 
Venezuela and Dominica engage in arbitration is ineffective 
because it undermines state sovereignty by dispensing with their 
right to consent to submit the dispute for resolution and 
requires states to be bound by its processes and procedures.206
If the U.N. subjects the Aves Island dispute to compulsory 
arbitration, it will encourage settlement noncompliance, extend 
U.N. Security Council inabilities to enforce noncompliance, and 
foster inefficiencies in the settlement of Venezuela’s and 
Dominica’s border dispute.207 Instead, Venezuela and Dominica 
should engage in a combination of mediation and arbitration to 
resolve their dispute.208 Engaging in Med-Arb will allow 
Venezuela and Dominica to maximize the efficacy and efficiency
of their dispute resolution process.209 By engaging in Med-Arb, 
Venezuela and Dominica may reach a mutually beneficial 
agreement, further international peace and security for all 
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states affected, and set a precedent for diplomatic resolution 
of disputes in the near future.210
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its operating system for copyright protection). Fujitsu claimed 
that it did not misappropriate I.B.M.’s operating system because 
the system, as the industry standard, became public domain. Id.
at 243-44.
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80 See Peter, supra note 23, at 103 (noting that mediation 
facilitates a subsequent, efficient arbitration by allowing the 
parties to establish a framework agreement that resolves 
preliminary issues and defines settlement procedures); see also
Stork, supra note 79, at 250 (conveying that Med-Arb’s process 
allows parties to select individually third-party facilitators, 
tailor informal processes to their needs, conduct private 
hearings, obtain faster resolution of their dispute, and expend 
less cost in the process).  
81 See Peter, supra note 23, at 88-90 (emphasizing that Med-Arb 
is most effect when disputing parties first engage in mediation 
and then transition to arbitration). But see De Vera, supra note 
56, at 155 (noting however, that mediation may merge into the 
arbitration thereby making Med-Arb’s stages less distinct). 
82 See De Vera, supra note 56, at 156 (stating that disputing 
parties may avoid engaging in Med-Arb’s arbitration phase where 
they reach a mutually beneficial agreement in Med-Arb’s 
mediation phase). 
83 See Peter, supra note 23, at 90 (averring this role change 
equips the third-party facilitator with prior understanding of 
the parties’ relationship and ultimate goals which results in a 
more efficient dispute resolution). 
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84 See id. at 88-89 (observing that courts grant Med-Arb awards 
more deference than settlements which are purely mediated). 
Parties may seek to enforce Med-Arb awards as contracts or 
arbitral awards binding under the New York Convention. Id. See
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 3, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, 
21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention] (obliging 
states party to the convention to recognize arbitral awards as 
binding and enforce those awards where relied upon by disputing 
states), available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.arbitration.recognition.and.enforcem
ent.convention.new.york.1958/doc.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2006).
85 See discussion infra Part II.A.1 (arguing that compulsory 
arbitration violates Article 2 by denying disputing states such 
as Venezuela and Dominica their state sovereignty).
86 See discussion infra Parts II.A.2, II.A.3, II.A.4 (claiming 
that state sovereignty encompasses the right to consent to 
dispute resolution and to self-determination).
87 See discussion infra Part II.B (reasoning that compulsory 
arbitration will result in settlement noncompliance by states 
which withhold initial consent dispute resolution and suggesting 
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such noncompliance makes compulsory arbitration innocuous due to 
weak international enforcement capabilities). 
88 See discussion infra Part II.C (arguing that arbitration will 
not maximize the efficiencies of dispute resolution under 
Article 33 of the U.N. Charter).
89 See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (conceding that compulsory 
arbitration is, in fact, vulnerable to criticisms of violating 
state sovereignty).
90 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 1 (noting the founders of the 
U.N. organized the U.N. based on the “sovereign equality of all 
its members”).
91 See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 
34 (June 30) (referencing the international standard that the 
I.C.J. cannot exercise jurisdiction over states without their 
sovereign consent); Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo 
(Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 126 (Feb. 3) 
(emphasizing that although states may imply consent to I.C.J. 
adjudication in certain circumstances, the I.C.J.’s basis for 
entertaining jurisdiction must stem from state consent according 
to its statute); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 I.C.J. 87 (Mar. 
16) (failing to rule on the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain 
where Britain did not consent to I.C.J. adjudication and where 
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the dispute affected Britain’s interests); Military and 
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27) (conveying that the necessity of state consent to 
international adjudication predated the establishment of the 
I.C.J.).   
92 See U.N. Charter art. 55 (basing the right to self-
determination on the need for peaceful and friendly relations 
between all states). Article 56 obliges all U.N. members to 
recognize the right of states to self-determination under 
Article 55. Id. art. 56.
93 See id. art. 2, para. 7 (stating that the “U.N. may not 
intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or . . . require [its] members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present charter . . 
. .”). Thus compulsory arbitration undermines the sovereign 
right of U.N. members such as Venezuela and Dominica their 
territorial and political independence. Id. arts. 1, 4. 
94 See id. art. 2 (indicating that states should use their 
equality to pursue the U.N.’s purposes set forth in Article 1); 
see also id. art. 1 (proclaiming that states should cooperate to 
solve international problems that are “economic, social, 
cultural, [and] humanitarian in character. . . .”); Cassese, 
supra note 2, at 88 (distinguishing sovereign equality of states 
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from states’ legal equality and noting that sovereign equality 
serves as the basis for international law). 
95 See Cassese, supra note 2, at 89-90 (mentioning that state 
sovereignty also encompasses the right to exercise authority 
over individuals that live within a state’s territory, immunity 
for sovereign state actions in the jurisdiction of foreign 
courts, and immunity for official actions performed by state 
representatives).
96 See id. at 89 (correlating a state’s right to protect the best 
interests of its citizens with a duty to promote state security 
within its territory). 
97 See Daily Journal, supra note 8 (reporting the Aves Island 
dispute significantly affects Venezuela’s and Dominica’s 
maritime boundaries and their right to exercise control over the 
resources located in the Island’s surrounding maritime 
territory). 
98
 Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Member States, 
U.N. Doc. ORG/1360/Rev.1  (Oct. 2, 2004) (recounting that 
Venezuela joined the U.N. on Nov. 15, 1945 and Dominica joined 
the U.N. on Dec. 18, 1978), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/ORG1360.rev.1.doc.htm
(last visited Mar. 5, 2006).
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99 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (granting U.N. member states 
the right to act to protect their “territorial integrity [and] 
political independence . . . .”). 
100 See id. (mandating that no state deprive U.N. member states 
their right to protect state interests and those of their 
citizens). 
101 C.f. East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34 
(implying that all interested states in a dispute must consent 
to dispute resolution before the I.C.J. can review the case). 
102 See id. para. 35 (refusing to entertain jurisdiction over 
Portugal and Australia where it needed to determine the 
lawfulness of Indonesia’s actions without its consent).
103 See id. para. 24 (noting that the I.C.J. may not rule with 
regard to states’ international responsibility where the ruling 
affects the legal interests of the non-consenting states). Even 
if Dominica seeks resolution of the Aves Island dispute under 
I.C.J. review, Venezuela could argue its legal interests in Aves 
Island form the subject matter of the dispute thereby precluding 
compulsory arbitration without its consent. Id.
104 See Declarations and Statements, supra note 40 (reporting 
that while Venezuela has not yet submitted to UNCLOS’ compulsory 
provisions, it may ratify the convention at any time and specify 
the forums for resolution of its disputes).
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105 See UNCLOS, supra note 41, art. 287, para. 1 (declaring 
states are free to choose to accept the jurisdiction of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the I.C.J., or 
other special arbitral tribunals to resolve their territorial 
disputes when signing or ratifying UNCLOS). 
106 Compare id. (empowering states such as Venezuela and Dominica 
with the sovereign right to choose to accept UNCLOS’ compulsory 
jurisdiction provisions), with I.C.J. Statute, supra note 66, 
art. 36 (granting states a sovereign right to consent to its 
compulsory jurisdiction).
107 See U.N. Charter art. 55 (indicating that states’ right to 
self-determination encourages international stability and well-
being). 
108 C.f. Port. v. Austl., 1995 I.C.J. para. 34 (correlating a 
violation of state sovereignty with a violation of states’ right 
to self-determination). 
109 See U.N. Charter art. 55 (highlighting that states enjoy a 
right to self-determination in “conditions of economic and 
social progress and development . . . .”).
110 See id. art. 2, para. 4 (empowering U.N. member states to act 
to further their economic and political interests).
111 See id. art. 56 (noting that U.N. members should take action 
to further their right to self-determination under Article 55). 
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112 See Islas o Dependencias Federales, 
http://espanol.geocities.com/josegarmo/islas.html (last visited 
Mar. 4, 2006) (attributing the Island’s increasing tourism to 
its many beaches and natural attractions). 
113 See UNCLOS, supra note 41, arts. 3, 57, 76 (setting forth 
that member states’ territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf 
are measured from their coastal baselines).     
114 See Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connection, supra note 25
(observing that access to the Caribbean maritime territory in 
dispute will grant states the exclusive right to explore and 
exploit its significant natural resources). 
115 See UNCLOS, supra note 41, art. 57 (providing UNCLOS member 
states with an EEZ up to 200 nm from their coastal baselines). 
In their EEZ, states have sovereign rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve and manage natural resources. Id. art. 56.
116 See Cassese, supra note 2, at 89 (positing that self-
determination in fact obligates states to take action in the 
best interest of their citizens).  
117 See U.N. Charter art. 33 (granting states the “choice” of 
enumerated dispute resolution methods to employ).
118 See generally East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 
(June 30) (considering Indonesia’s sovereign right to consent to 
dispute resolution as an interested third-party).
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119 See id. para. 34 (explaining that because the East Timor 
dispute implicated Indonesia’s rights and obligations, Indonesia 
enjoyed the right to self-determination). 
120 See U.N. Charter art. 55 (vesting Venezuela and Dominica, as 
U.N. member states, with the right to determine a method of 
dispute resolution that will best resolve their dispute).
121 See id. art. 33 (vesting U.N. members a choice of 
internationally accepted methods of dispute resolution). 
122 See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 101 (conceding that party 
autonomy and flexibility are integral to effective dispute 
settlement). But see id. at 89 (suggesting the U.N. should 
deprive states flexibility in resolving their territorial 
boundary disputes by implementing compulsory arbitration). 
123 See U.N. Charter art. 55 (emphasizing all states should 
recognize the right of U.N. member states to self-
determination). 
124 Compare Infoplease Venezuela, supra note 31 (reporting 
Venezuela had a gross domestic product in 2004 of $145.2 
billion), with Infoplease Daily Almanac, Dominica, 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107471.html (last visited Mar. 
5, 2006) (reporting that Dominica only approximates a gross 
domestic product of $384 million).
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125 See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (noting that formal dispute 
resolution is less important for larger, more powerful states 
because they may utilize their economic resources to apply 
pressure to smaller and weaker nations).  
126 See id. (implying that economically powerful nations may not 
even need to engage in formal dispute resolution).
127 See id. at 99-100 (noting smaller and more economically weak 
states may seek to employ means of dispute resolution that will 
place them on equal footing with more economically powerful 
states).
128 See Peter, supra note 23, at 87 (conveying that impartial 
procedures and arbiter neutrality are two of arbitration’s main 
advantages). But see id. at 86-87 (attributing the costly 
procedures of international arbitration to the arbitral bodies’ 
required opinion). 
129 See id. at 84 (noting autonomy and flexibility of procedures 
are two of mediation’s advantages). Dominica, for example, may 
wish to specify time and date restrictions, facilitator rights 
and duties, and various enforcement provisions in an agreement 
with Venezuela. Id.
130 Compare U.N. Charter art. 33 (granting U.N. member states 
flexibility by allowing them to choose their preferred method of 
dispute settlement), with East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 
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I.C.J. 90, para. 34 (June 30) (emphasizing the right of states 
to choose to engage in dispute resolution).  
131 See discussion infra Part II.B (arguing that compulsory 
jurisdiction will not effectively resolve the dispute over Aves 
Island because it will encourage noncompliance and create 
enforcement issues).
132 See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (discussing why losing 
parties are unlikely to implement unfavorable judgments).
133 See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (averring that even though 
Article 94 of the U.N. Charter empowers the Security Council to 
take action to enforce the I.C.J.’s decisions, the Security 
Council’s unwillingness to intervene makes the provision 
essentially ineffective).
134 See Peters, supra note 10, at 2 (claiming the Friendly 
Relations Doctrine imparts a general duty for all states to 
cooperate in their interstate relations).
135 See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 33 (correlating the duty of U.N. 
member states to attempt, in good faith, peaceful resolution of 
their international disputes). States should attempt to maintain 
friendly relations with other states as well. Id. arts. 55-56.
136 See Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connection, supra note 25
(reporting that although the disputed maritime territory 
contains fishery resources, the vast amount of natural gas that 
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lies in the seabed is actually driving the dispute; see also
Paulsson, supra note 1, at 123 (imparting that more than fifteen 
percent of un-delimited maritime territory contains oil and 
natural gas reserves).
137 See Peters, supra note 10, at 17 (conveying that state 
cooperation stems from their initial consent to dispute 
resolution).
138 See Nejib Jebril, Note and Comment, The Binding Dilemma: From 
Bakassi to Badme – Making States Comply with Territorial 
Decisions of International Judicial Bodies, 19 Am. U. Int’l L.
Rev. 633, 635 (attributing Nigeria’s noncompliance with the 
I.C.J.’s grant of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon to Nigeria’s 
failure to consent to resolution of the dispute). This case 
exemplifies the I.C.J’s inability to enforce decisions. Id. at 
636, 645.
139 See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (remarking that no method of 
dispute resolution may prove effective where states are 
disinclined to cooperate); c.f. Bakassi, supra note 70
(commenting that although Nigeria did not openly reject the 
I.C.J.’s judgment, it failed to comply with the I.C.J.’s 
decision and called for more negotiations with Cameroon because 
it claimed that it did not accept the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction).
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140 See Declarations and Statements, supra note 40 (iterating 
that Venezuela has not signed, ratified, or acceded to the 
compulsory provisions of UNCLOS). 
141 See Bakassi, supra note 70 (reporting that Nigeria refused to 
withdraw its military from the Bakassi Peninsula after the 
I.C.J. granted its sovereignty to Cameroon).
142 See Jack J. Coe, Jr., The Serviceable Texts of International 
Commercial Arbitration: An Embarrassment of Riches, 10 
Willamette J. Int’l L. & Disp. Resol. 143, 145 (2002) (noting 
that contractual enforcement may affect party compliance). 
143 See Peters, supra note 10, at 17 (theorizing that consent to 
dispute resolution is crucial to effective settlement of states’ 
disputes).
144 See Jibril, supra note 138, at 650-51 (commenting on 
international bodies’ lack of enforcement power when states 
draft weak arbitration agreements).
145 See IRINNEWS.ORG, supra note 28 (indicating that Nigeria has 
not recognized or complied with the I.C.J.’s decision).
146 See U.N. Charter art. 94 (granting states the right to seek 
recourse and enforcement of the I.C.J.’s decisions through the 
U.N. Security Council). The U.N. Security Council may enforce 
I.C.J. decisions through military force if necessary. Id. art. 
26. 
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147 See International Court of Justice, Declarations Recognizing 
as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court [hereinafter I.C.J. 
Declarations], http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm
(last visited Mar. 5, 2006) (reporting that Venezuela and 
Dominica have not yet accepted the compulsory jurisdiction 
provisions of the I.C.J.).
148 See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, para. 34
(June 30) (reiterating that the I.C.J. may only hear cases in 
which states consent to its jurisdiction). 
149 See Jibril, supra note 138, at 659 (conveying one reason the 
I.C.J.’s decisions are vulnerable to enforcement inability is 
due to states’ amicable political connections with the Security 
Council).
150 See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (setting forth: “If any 
party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon 
it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may 
have recourse to the Security Council . . . .”).
151 See Ifesi, supra note 75 (recanting that even though the 
I.C.J.’s 2002 decision had “binding” effect, Cameroon and 
Nigeria set up a commission to negotiate their interests 
further). 
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152 See U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (empowering the U.N. 
Security Council to “make recommendations or decide upon 
measures” that it should take to enforce I.C.J. judgments).
153 See Jibril, supra note 138, at 659 (discussing the U.N. 
Security Council’s hesitancy to intervene in disputes between 
member states); see also Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order in the 
Post-Cold War Era: The Relevance and Role of the United Nations 
After Fifty Years, 20 Brook. J. Int’l L. 255, 266-67 (1994) 
(remarking the U.N. Security Council requires a substantial 
amount of time to organize military intervention).  
154 See Infoplease Venezuela, supra note 31 (conveying that 
Venezuela maintains large reserves of petroleum and iron ore). 
155 See Caricom, Caribbean Community Secretariat: The Caricom
Single Market Economy, 
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/single_market_index.jsp
?menu=csme (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) (emphasizing a major goal 
of the Caribbean Single Market Economy is to increase intra-
regional movement of resources between Caribbean States).  
156 See I.C.J. Declarations, supra note 140 (pointing out that 
since the I.C.J.’s formation in 1945, Venezuela has not accepted 
its compulsory jurisdiction).
157 See discussion infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2 (arguing compulsory 
arbitration creates inefficiencies for both international 
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dispute resolution bodies and disputing states such as Venezuela 
and Dominica).
158 See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (claiming that mandatory 
arbitration will create inefficiency in the hierarchy of 
acceptable dispute resolution mechanisms set forth in Article 33 
of the U.N. Charter).
159 See discussion infra Part II.C.2 (suggesting that states such 
as Venezuela and Dominica will lose the benefits and 
efficiencies of regional dispute settlement mechanisms).
160 See U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1 (implying resolution of 
disputes through bilateral negotiations or regional settlement 
potentially decreases the number of disputes that U.N. member 
states submit to the I.C.J. for review). 
161 See id. (intimating states should only resort to I.C.J. 
adjudication where bilateral dispute resolution fails to resolve 
their dispute). 
162 See Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 94, para. 66-67 (June 11)
(Preliminary Objections) (discussing how regional mechanisms 
such as the Lake Chad Commission may increase dispute 
resolution’s efficacy and efficiency where disputes involve 
facts specific to their region). 
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163 See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (suggesting arbitration 
subject to I.C.J. review encourages states to bypass bilateral 
negotiations and regional settlement mechanisms).
164 See Charter of the Organization of American States art. 85, 
December 13, 1951, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing the Permanent 
Council “shall assist the parties and recommend the procedures 
it considers suitable for peaceful settlement of the dispute . . 
. .”), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/oascharter.html#ch12 (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2006).
165 See Vidmar, supra note 5, at 99 (assuming, falsely, that the 
I.C.J.’s review of all territorial disputes adds effectiveness 
and efficiency to dispute resolution because all territorial 
disputes involve the same principles). But see Paulsson, supra
note 1, at 126 (noting that the application of uniform 
principles to disputes which involve different, case-specific 
facts will not effectively resolve all boundary disputes). 
166 See generally U.N. Charter arts. 52-54 (providing U.N. member 
states the opportunity to engage in dispute resolution within 
regional bodies).  
167 See Cameroon v. Nig., 1998 I.C.J. paras. 66-67 (noting the 
Lake Chad Commission, a regional settlement body, appropriately 
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hears and decides issues of international peace and security 
specific to its region). 
168 See U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 2 (obliging U.N. members to 
attempt resolution of their disputes through regional settlement 
mechanisms before submitting their disputes to the U.N. for 
resolution). 
169 See id. para. 1 (emphasizing that certain disputes between 
U.N. member states are best resolved through regional 
mechanisms).
170 See USAID Supports Alternative Dispute Resolution in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 
www.usaid.gov/locations/latin_america_caribbean/pdf/dg_conflict.
pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2006) (indicating the use of experts 
during mediation increases the states’ productivity during the 
settlement process).
171 See Symposium, International Rule of Law, A.B.A., Latin 
America & Caribbean Law Initiative Council (Nov. 9-10, 2005), 
http://www.rolsymposium.org/lalic.html (last visited Mar. 5, 
2006) (noting mediation may strengthen relations between 
neighbor states and aid the development of states’ individual 
governments).
172 See World Bank Group: Legal and Judicial Reform, Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 
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http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/institutions_adr.html
(last visited Mar. 5, 2006) (stating additionally that effective 
dispute settlement will reduce caseloads that international 
bodies must review).
173 See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B (advocating that Med-
Arb is a more effective and efficient method of dispute 
resolution for territorial boundary disputes than is compulsory 
arbitration).
174 See discussion infra Parts III.A, III.B (suggesting that 
states which engage in Med-Arb to resolve their territorial 
boundary disputes are more likely to reach and comply with a 
mutually beneficial agreement).
175 See discussion infra Part III.B (proposing that Venezuela and 
Dominica may capitalize on the benefits of both mediation and 
arbitration if they employ Med-Arb during their dispute 
settlement).
176 C.f. Int’l Bus. Mach., Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am. Arb. 
Ass’n No. 13T-117-0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.)
(discussing how I.B.M. and Fujitsu made the resolution of their 
dispute more effective by engaging in Med-Arb). 
177 See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 33 (obliging U.N. member states to 
attempt to resolve their international disputes in good faith).  
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178 See De Vera, supra note 56, at 152 (implying that parties 
that reach agreement through mediation are more likely to 
resolve their dispute definitively and comply with the 
agreement).  
179 See Peter, supra note 23, at 106-14 (discussing how Med-Arb 
effectively resolves international disputes in China, Germany, 
and Switzerland).
180 See De Vera, supra note 56, at 153 (observing the arbitration 
phase of Med-Arb requires states to consent to settlement).  
181 See Peter, supra note 23, at 103 (recanting that I.B.M. and 
Fujitsu documented their consent to be bound by Med-Arb’s 
subsequent processes in an agreement they formed during the 
initial phase of Med-Arb).
182 See id. at 103-04 (commenting that the parties initial 
framework agreement encompassed the details of the parties’ 
future negotiations, mediation, arbitration, negotiated rule-
making and other various dispute resolution procedures). 
183 Cf. id. (noting that Med-Arb facilitated various agreements 
which made the rest of the parties’ dispute resolution process 
more effective).
184 See De Vera, supra note 56, at 156 (adding that even partial 
agreements are beneficial because they allow the parties to 
resolve certain factual issues).
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185 See Peters, supra note 10, at 26-27 (emphasizing that 
cooperation is integral to effective enforcement of decisions). 
186 See Peter, supra note 23, at 105 (suggesting that states may 
increase the effectiveness of their dispute settlement process 
by employing Med-Arb because it will allow them to establish a 
relationship for future cooperation).
187 See id. at 106 (suggesting parties that reach an agreement 
during Med-Arb’s mediation phase increase the likelihood that 
Med-Arb will effectively settle their dispute). 
188 See Peters, supra note 10, at 6-7 (theorizing that methods of 
dispute resolution which avoid a “winner-takes-all solution” but 
reaches a consensual agreement are more effective and likely to 
encourage compliance). Because Med-Arb is consistent with 
Venezuela’s and Dominica’s sovereignty and will foster a 
mutually beneficial agreement, Venezuela and Dominica will 
likely comply with any resulting award. Id.
189 See generally Int’l Bus. Mach., Corp. v. Fujitsu, Ltd., 4 Am. 
Arb. Ass’n No. 13T-117-0636-85 (1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs.)
(allowing I.B.M. and Fujitsu to autonomously set the procedures 
of mediation and arbitration during their dispute settlement).
190 C.f. id. at 29, n.3 (noting that both I.B.M. and Fujitsu 
agreed to abide by the arbitral rules of the American 
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Arbitration Association). Such agreement made their dispute 
resolution process more effective. Id.
191 See De Vera, supra note 56, at 161 (noting that Med-Arb 
awards vest “the settlement reached by parties” with legal 
effect). Similarly, Venezuela and Dominica may agree for a Med-
Arb award to have binding effect on both states. Id.
192 See New York Convention, supra note 84, art. 1 (granting 
signatories the right to seek enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in host countries). The enforcing court may not, however, 
impose “more onerous conditions or higher fees” than that 
imposed for domestic awards. Id. art. 3.  
193 See Katz, supra note 55, at 111 (stating that international 
dispute resolution encourages effective settlement and 
compliance because it causes parties to trust the impartiality 
of its awards).  
194 See De Vera, supra note 56, at 155 (relating Med-Arb’s 
mediation phase may increase the efficiency of dispute 
resolution by saving parties time and expenses). But see id.
(considering that cultural differences may undermine the 
efficiency of Med-Arb).
195 See Peter, supra note 23, at 105 (indicating that the 
mediator’s ability to tailor Med-Arb’s subsequent arbitration 
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phase is one of Med-Arb’s major procedural advantages in terms 
of efficiency). 
196 See id. at 104 (suggesting that I.B.M. and Fujitsu had 
resources sufficient to continue their settlement procedures for 
many years). 
197 See id. at 83-84 (positing that states may increase the 
efficiency of their dispute resolution procedures by employing 
Med-Arb); see also De Vera, supra note 56, at 154-55 (remarking 
that Med-Arb allows states to obtain settlement of their dispute 
both quickly and easily).
198 See Peter, supra note 23, at 106 (implying that the time 
necessary to allocate the fault of disputing parties decreases 
the efficiency of dispute resolution). 
199 See De Vera, supra note 56, at 156-57 (averring that parties 
that reach agreement during Med-Arb’s initial phase 
significantly increase the efficiency of the subsequent 
arbitration phase by resolving preliminary, factual issues).
200 See Peter, supra note 23, at 91 (discussing the opportunity 
for parties to engage in a modified version of Med-Arb where 
they question the mediator’s validity as an arbiter). 
201 See id. at 105-06 (discussing how the third-party mediator’s 
transition to arbiter increases Med-Arb’s efficiency by allowing 
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the arbiter to focus on the goals of settlement rather than the 
parties’ entitlements).
202 See id. at 106 (noting the mediator’s deeper understanding of 
the dispute makes the arbitration phase more efficient because 
the arbiter bases a decision on broader comprehension of the 
dispute). 
203 See De Vera, supra note 56, at 156-57 (asserting the time and 
discovery expenses that the third-party facilitator saves during 
Med-Arb translates directly into a more efficient dispute 
settlement process for the parties employing Med-Arb).
204 See Paulsson, supra note 1, at 122 (implying the objective of 
international law is to resolve disputes before they escalate to 
armed conflict; thereby furthering international peace and 
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